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Zaburoni HIV case: The law can sometimes be an ass, but not in this case 
 
Andrew Garwood-Gowers and Andrew McGee, Faculty of Law, Queensland University 
of Technology  
 
Lana Nowakowski’s opinion piece on the High Court decision in the Zaburoni HIV case 
("HIV-positive ruling: Outcry should be directed at Qld lawmakers") attacks "Queensland's 
absurd necessity to prove intention on transmission" and argues that "[c]hanges to the law are 
long overdue". Both claims are wrong.  
 
The article itself briefly mentions that Zaburoni was still guilty of the offence of grievous 
bodily harm (GBH) under section 320 of the Queensland Criminal Code, which does not 
require proof of intent. Yet this crucial fact is then ignored later in the article, when 
Nowakowski suggests that the High Court decision “leaves no legal options for the victim to 
pursue, other than suing Zaburoni for compensation”, and then, in conclusion, refers to the 
“absurd necessity to prove intent”.  
 
The reader may form the misleading impression that Zaburoni could not be convicted of any 
other offence, and was free to walk out of court. But the fact is his deplorable conduct made 
him guilty of grievous bodily harm which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years. Once this 
fact is acknowledged, the author's main argument collapses. 
 
In many criminal offences, it is not necessary to prove intent. Proof that the accused’s 
conduct caused a particular result is enough. But in some circumstances, a more serious 
offence, requiring proof of an actual intent to bring about that result, is added. This offence is 
invariably considered to be more morally reprehensible, and attracts a harsher penalty.   
 
A good example is murder and manslaughter. Murder requires proof of an intent to kill or do 
grievous bodily harm to the victim. Manslaughter involves the killing of another without 
proof of that intent. The law correctly treats murder as more reprehensible than manslaughter.  
 
Nowakowski appears not to recognise different levels of moral culpability between reckless 
acts and acts intended to bring about a particular harm. By labelling the intent requirement as 
“absurd” she implies that it should be removed. If we take this logic further it would mean we 
should abolish murder and just have manslaughter. In our view, that would be the real 
absurdity. 
 
If the author wishes to point the finger at someone for the Zaburoni result it should be the 
prosecution, which decided not to accept Zaburoni's plea of guilty to the GBH charge and 
instead pursued the more serious charge of intentional transmission. The prosecution was 
encouraged to do so by one successful case a few years earlier (the Reid case). But the facts 
of that case were different, and the evidence in the Zaburoni case simply didn’t warrant the 
conclusion there was intent.  
 
In the Zaburoni case, the High Court has simply corrected the errors made first by the District 
Court jury in convicting him of intentional transmission and second by the Queensland Court 
of Appeal, which upheld the conviction. The law as it stands is fine. The danger with 
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unwarranted and misconceived criticism of the law is that it can undermine respect for the 
legal system in the eyes of the public.  
 
